What Is Interaction? by Hornbæk, Kasper & Oulasvirta, Antti
u n i ve r s i t y  o f  co pe n h ag e n  
Københavns Universitet
What Is Interaction?
Hornbæk, Kasper; Oulasvirta, Antti
Published in:
Proceedings of the 2017 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems
DOI:
10.1145/3025453.3025765
Publication date:
2017
Document version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Citation for published version (APA):
Hornbæk, K., & Oulasvirta, A. (2017). What Is Interaction? In Proceedings of the 2017 CHI Conference on
Human Factors in Computing Systems (pp. 5040-5052). Association for Computing Machinery.
https://doi.org/10.1145/3025453.3025765
Download date: 03. Feb. 2020
 What  Is  Interaction?  
Kasper Hornbæk 
University of Copenhagen 
 
Antti Oulasvirta 
Aalto University 
ABSTRACT  
The term interaction is field-defining, yet surprisingly con-
fused. This essay discusses what interaction is. We first ar-
gue that only few attempts to directly define interaction ex-
ist. Nevertheless, we extract from the literature distinct and 
highly developed concepts, for instance viewing interaction 
as dialogue, transmission, optimal behavior, embodiment, 
and tool use. Importantly, these concepts are associated 
with different scopes and ways of construing the causal re-
lationships between the human and the computer. This af-
fects their ability to inform empirical studies and design. 
Based on this discussion, we list desiderata for future work 
on interaction, emphasizing the need to improve scope and 
specificity, to better account for the effects and agency that 
computers have in interaction, and to generate strong prop-
ositions about interaction. 
Keywords  
Interaction; human-computer interaction; scientific pro-
gress; concepts; models; theories. 
ACM  Classification  Keywords  
H.5.m. Information interfaces and presentation (e.g., HCI): 
Miscellaneous. 
INTRODUCTION  
The term interaction is a workhorse for our field. It is an el-
ement of the names Human-Computer Interaction and In-
teraction Design, as well as a multiplicity of topics and the-
ories, such as reality-based interaction [45], seven stages of 
interaction [63], and embodied interaction [25]. In the CHI 
2016 proceedings, the word occurs more than 4 500 times. 
The folk notion behind such uses seems to be that of two 
entities (computer, human) engaged in an interplay of sorts.  
For such a field-defining concept, however, it is underde-
fined. Open a textbook on HCI and you will likely look in 
vain for a definition. In Designing the User Interface, 4th 
ed. [82], entries on “interaction” concern interaction devic-
es, styles, and systems; the first chapter of the textbook, In-
teraction Design: Beyond Human-computer Interaction 
[73], is eloquent about interaction design but silent about 
interaction per se. Turning to research papers, Beaudouin-
Lafon [8] argued that HCI is “far from having solid (and 
falsifiable) theories of interaction” and Payne [67] lamented 
that “despite its name, the field of HCI has not devoted 
much research attention to the nature of interaction”. Re-
cently, it has been suggested that interaction “hinges on an 
outmoded notion of technology in use” [85, p. 50] and that 
we need to move “beyond interaction” [88]. The confusion 
is complete. Perhaps this has contributed to HCI’s claimed 
lack of “motor themes, mainstream topics, and schools of 
thought” [53] and “low problem-solving capacity” [66].  
What is interaction? This essay analyzes the concept from a 
pragmatic perspective of problem-solving [66]: Instead of 
asking what ‘the right’ definition of interaction is, our ulti-
mate aim is to understand what kinds of theories and con-
cepts of interaction are out there, and how they might be 
formulated so as to be useful for HCI. We ask how they 
construe interaction in terms of relations among humans 
and computers, and what this construal implies for their ca-
pacity to inform decisions in design.  
Why bother? We see three benefits. First and foremost, 
moving from everyday concepts to sharper, scientific con-
cepts is key to all scholarship; we should be able to better 
define, measure, reason about, and predict interaction. Se-
cond, how you understand interaction impacts your work by 
affecting your notion of what makes interaction good; it 
works as a thinking tool. However, we know of no previous 
account of the assumptions, uses, and limitations of this 
tool. Third, independently of the confusion around current 
views of interaction, we see it as the glue that ties our field 
together. Any clarity might help bring together the disparate 
disciplines and belief systems in HCI.  
MISSING  IN  ACTION:  DEFINITIONS  OF  INTERACTION  
We first argue that attempts to directly define interaction 
are either absent from the literature or stuck with folk no-
tions. To do so, we survey some influential textbooks and 
handbooks. We then cover some old and a few newer dis-
cussions of interaction. Finally, we discuss what is missing. 
Folk  Notions  of  Interaction  
Most textbooks (e.g., [73,77,82]) and handbooks (e.g., 
[39,44]) provide a sparse coverage of “interaction”. The 
books referenced have many entries about interaction, such 
as “interaction devices”, “interactive systems”, and “inter-
action design”. For instance, The Handbook on Human-
Computer Interaction [44] lists entries on interaction, span-
ning modalities of interaction, over interaction design and 
children to interaction with networked systems. But no en-
try provides a definition or high-level discussion of interac-
tion. Interaction Design: Beyond Human-computer Interac-
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 tion [73] contains one chapter on interaction, viewing it as 
instructing or conversation, but lacks a direct definition. 
Saffer [77] offers a more detailed definition than most:  
“An interaction, grossly speaking, is a transaction be-
tween two entities, typically an exchange of information, 
but it can also be an exchange of goods or services. […] It 
is this sort of exchange that interaction designers try to 
engender in their work. Interaction designers design for 
the possibility of interaction. The interaction itself takes 
place between people, machines, and systems, in a variety 
of combinations.” (p.4). 
This definition is a step forward but raises a myriad of 
questions. Can only information be transmitted? What is the 
difference between a narrow (machines) and a broad (sys-
tems) view of that we interact with? What about the experi-
ence of transacting? What happens over time? To sum up, 
most of the field’s go-to books provide either folk notions 
of interaction or discuss theories and models without relat-
ing them to a defined concept.  
Ongoing  Discussions  of  Interaction  and  Interactivity  
Several academics have echoed this sentiment. In a 1990 
keynote at CHI, Winograd [90] asked, “What do we mean 
by human-computer interaction?” and continued, “Webster 
defines ‘interaction’ as ‘mutual or reciprocal action or in-
fluence.’ Clearly, humans act on computers and computers 
influence humans. But how? In what dimensions?” (p. 444-
445). Others argue similarly [67]. 
A few papers have provided in-depth discussions of interac-
tion. Bødker and Kammersgaard distinguished four types of 
interaction—system, tool, dialogue partner, and media (cit-
ed in [69]; see also [49])—and discussed the actors and ide-
als involved in those types. Pike et al. [70] discussed the 
prospects and contents of a science of interaction, focusing 
on visualizations. Svanæs [84] reviewed the philosophy of 
interaction, contrasting the cognitive science view with 
those of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty.   
Instead of interaction, some work has discussed interactivi-
ty [33,47,48]; this is a prominent theme in communication 
and advertisement research. In HCI, Janlert and Stolterman 
[47] reviewed the literature, concluding that agency, pre-
dictability, and pace are important characteristics. They did 
not attempt to define interaction in such a way that it was 
compatible with these characteristics. Kirsh [52] also dis-
cussed the concept of interactivity. He noted that many 
basic psychological processes are interactional and used 
this view to critique of plan-driven models of interaction, in 
particular of Norman’s seven-stage model. Overall, howev-
er, most definitions of interactivity treat it as a quality of an 
interface and says little about the interplay with the human. 
At the same time, the notion of interaction itself has been 
criticized. Taylor wrote that interaction “hinges on an out-
moded notion of technology in use” [85, p. 50]. He argued 
that the boundary between things supposed to interact is too 
hard to locate and that interaction design is about world 
making (and not just the interplay between people and ma-
chines). Others have voiced similar concerns [88]. 
What  Is  Missing?  
The work surveyed above shows some progress in critiqu-
ing and refining the dictionary definition and folk notions 
of interaction. Yet, a lot is missing. First, as we argue in the 
following, we find that HCI already has rich views of inter-
action, but they are tacit and intertwined in the multiple 
theories of HCI. How do they view and define interaction? 
We find it valuable to extract those views and make their 
content and assumptions scrutinizable, as the first step in 
moving toward scientific concepts of interaction. Second, 
with the exception of Bødker and Kammersgaard, the dis-
cussions have been about the merits of one view of interac-
tion. There is little comparison of the relative merits and 
shortcomings of the views. Third, it is not clear what work a 
view of interaction should do. Extracting and discussing ex-
isting concepts of interaction might help make this clear. 
CONCEPTS  OF  INTERACTION  IN  HCI’S  THEORIES  
Although attempts to define interaction are somewhat con-
fused, a main take-away of this paper is that more devel-
oped concepts do exist, yet they have been embedded in 
some of the well-known theories of human-computer inter-
action. To show this, this section extracts seven concepts of 
interaction by examining the literature of HCI. The views 
were selected because they are much cited, cover very dif-
ferent notions of interaction, and are discussed frequently 
(at least individually) in textbooks; one view, interaction-
as-control, was included because it views interaction mainly 
as statistical determination (we later explain what this is 
and why it is important). We make no claim to cover all 
concepts of interaction in the history of HCI or in its nu-
merous theories. We recognize missing accounts, such as 
those about symbolic value, behavior change, neural sys-
tems, integration, and collaboration. Yet, the ones we iden-
tify seem so central to HCI’s intellectual history that any 
discussion of “What is interaction?” must deal with them. 
Table 1 summarizes the concepts. The three right-hand col-
umns were developed as a synthesis of the key differences 
among views. Note that they are synthesized over many pa-
pers and may not directly map to a particular school or the-
ory or model. Also, have patience with the length of the 
synthesis; it is necessary to get clarity on the concepts’ sta-
tus before discussing their differences. 
In the following, we build on the work of Dubin [26]. He 
considers a proposition a theoretical statement that links 
constructs (or “units” in Dubin’s terms; these could be hu-
man, coupling, experience, computer) with how they play 
together (which he calls “interacts”), the boundaries of the 
proposition, and the overall state of the system being con-
sidered. Propositions can be both about processes and about 
outcomes (corresponding roughly to understanding and 
predicting). We are looking for propositions about the link 
or interplay or type of action between humans and comput-
ers; we call those concepts of interaction. 
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 Interaction  as  Dialogue  
This concept sees interaction as a cycle of communication 
acts channeled through input/output from the machine per-
spective, or perception/action from the human perspective. 
Interaction as dialogue has been prominent from the early 
history of HCI. Nickerson et al. [61] suggested that “the 
thing that, above all others, makes the man-computer inter-
action different from the interaction that occurs in other 
man-machine systems is the fact the former has the nature 
of a dialogue” (p.129). The concept of dialogue was also 
used by Card et al. [14, p. 4] as background for GOMS.  
Dialogue is composed of stages or turns. Norman’s seven-
stage model [62] is one detailed account of such stages; 
others talk about turns [67]. Norman’s stages go from users 
formulating their goal, over specifying and executing the 
actions needed to move that goal forward, to perceiving the 
resulting system state and relating that to the goal. Under-
standing interaction-as-dialogue stresses the need for users’ 
acts to be understood by the computer and for users to un-
derstand the computer. For Norman, this means that map-
ping and feedback become crucial concepts for appreciating 
user interfaces. Mapping requires the user to figure out how 
to achieve an intention with an interface or the task where 
“the user must translate the psychological goals and inten-
tions into the desired system state, then determine what set-
tings of the control mechanisms will yield that state, and 
then determine what physical manipulations of the mecha-
nism are required”, [62, p. 37]. These in turn are related to 
the concepts of gulf-of-execution and gulf-of-evaluation, 
which describe breakdowns when users seek to express 
their intentions and interpret feedback from the system.  
Further, this concept highlights understanding, directness, 
and simplicity. Successful interfaces should “provide a 
strong sense of understanding and control” [62, p. 49] and 
“The easier and more direct these two mappings, the easier 
and more pleasant the learning and use of the interface” (p. 
53). Interaction-as-dialogue speaks of directness to clarify 
what makes mappings easy: “The ‘naturalness’ of a map-
ping is related to the directness of the mapping, where di-
rectness can be measured by the complexity of the relation-
ship between representation and value, measure by the 
length of the description of the mapping”. [64, p. 28-29].  
This concept has inspired several forms of support for eval-
uation and construction of interaction. In evaluation, the 
view is used in the User Action Framework [2] and by 
some as the foundation for cognitive walkthrough [74]; 
guessability studies are one way of evaluating good interac-
tion from this view [92]. The seven stages of action can also 
be used as design aids [63, pp. 52-53]). Mixed-initiative de-
sign guidelines also use the concept of stages [42].  
Interaction  as  Transmission  (of  Information)  
This concept sees interaction as transmission of information 
between the computer and the user. The rate of transmission 
can be used as a criterion for what makes a good interface, 
and the rate of transmission from computer to human and 
vice versa can be evaluated and improved through design. 
The focus is not on turn-taking or communicative acts (as in 
dialogue), but on passing of messages with information 
content over a channel with limited capacity and noise. 
More formally, transmission occurs when a message is se-
lected from a set of possible messages and transferred to the 
receiver over a noisy channel. The size of the set of possible 
messages determines the information content of the trans-
fer. In HCI, this concept is based on Shannon’s theory of 
communication [27,58,81,89]. This concept operationalizes 
the rate of message passing as throughput.   
This concept of interaction sees good interaction as being 
about the rate with which bits can be correctly communi-
cated. For instance, in discrete aimed movements, a user in-
terface is organized into targets with spatially defined areas. 
The user communicates by aiming and moving an end-
effector within one of them. The number of messages is de-
fined as the number of areas that could have been selected. 
Concept 
View of interaction Key phenomena and con-
structs 
Good interaction Example support for  
evaluation and design 
Dialogue a cyclic process of commu-
nication acts and their inter-
pretations 
mappings between UI and in-
tentions; feedback from the UI; 
turn taking 
understandable; simple, 
natural; direct 
methods/concepts for 
guessability, feedback, 
mapping; walkthroughs 
Transmis-
sion 
a sender sending a message 
over a noisy channel 
messages (bits); sender and 
receiver; noisy channels 
maximum throughput of in-
formation 
metrics and models of user 
performance  
Tool use a human that uses tools to 
manipulate and act in the 
world 
mediation by tools; directness 
of acting in the world; activity 
as a unit of analysis 
useful and transparent 
tools; amplification of hu-
man capabilities 
compatibility in instrumental 
interaction; break down 
analysis 
Optimal 
behavior 
adapting behavior to goals, 
task, UI, and capabilities 
rationality; constraints; prefer-
ences; utility; strategies 
improves or reaches max-
imum or satisfactory utility 
models of choice, foraging, 
and adaptation 
Embodi-
ment 
acting and being in situations 
of a material and social world 
intentionality; context; coupling provides resources for and 
supports fluent participa-
tion in the world  
studies in the wild; thick 
description  
Experience an ongoing stream of expec-
tations, feelings, memories 
non-utilitarian quality; expecta-
tions; emotion 
satisfies psychological 
needs; motivating 
metrics of user experience; 
experience design methods 
Control interactive minimization of 
error against some reference 
feedforward; feedback; refer-
ence; system; dynamics 
rapid and stable conver-
gence to target state 
executable simulations of 
interactive control tasks  
Table 1. Overview of some key concepts of interaction in HCI literature. The columns sum up the core view of what interaction is, 
the key phenomena that the view has helped see and their associated constructs, the notion of good interaction that follows from the 
view, and the key techniques and methods to help evaluating and designing user interfaces. 
Design Frameworks CHI 2017, May 6–11, 2017, Denver, CO, USA
5042
 In addition to aiming and choice, this concept is also appli-
cable to computer output. This has happened less formally 
(for instance in Tufte’s data-ink ratio [87], which requires 
visualizations to communicate the most information with 
the least effort) or formally, as in visual encoding [19]. 
Goodness is thus on the one hand determined by the com-
plexity of messages an agent can pass. The more possible 
messages that could be communicated, the better. On the 
other hand, goodness is also determined by how much time 
must be spent to complete messaging.  
In both cases the concept of interaction as transmission may 
drive design. Beyond offering measurable constructs, its 
understanding of interaction can be taken as an objective 
for design. Balakrishnan [4], for instance, synthesized re-
search on pointing by its attempt to beat Fitts’s Law, that is, 
to increase throughput by redesigning the factors that limit 
transmission. Work on smoothing input for gesture recog-
nizers also attempt to deal with noisy channels [17,93].  
Interaction  as  Tool  Use  
This concept sees interaction as tool use, not different from 
using a hammer to drive nails or a mental rule to calculate 
algebra in one’s head [3]. This concept is pervasive in HCI 
in different forms, and central in (for instance) activity the-
ory [10,55]. The computer, when viewed as a tool, is some-
thing manipulated by users to affect change and to extend 
themselves. Interaction, then, is about manipulation (use) of 
technology for some aims beyond the tool itself.  
Three implications arise. First, this concept suggests that in-
teraction (and the associated tools) shapes us and how we 
act. Activity theory [10,55] captures this in the notion of 
mediation, taken to mean that “tool use influences the na-
ture of external behavior and also the mental functioning of 
individuals”. Beaudoin-Lafon [7] has developed this into a 
notion of interaction instruments, the parts of the computer 
that mediates between the user and the domain objects of 
interest. In general, this concept claims that the tools and 
the tasks people do with them mutually influence each oth-
er; this is also emphasized in the task-artifact cycle [16].  
Second, interaction-as-tool-use emphasizes the mediating 
role of the tool; the point is to “act through the interface” 
[10]. Therefore, the degree to which the interface interferes 
with doing this is key; this has been captured in notions of 
breakdowns [11] or, positively phrased, in ideals of direct 
manipulation [43], transparent, or invisible UIs [65].  
Third, interaction-as-tool-use naturally emphasizes use: 
“strictly speaking, nothing is a tool except during use”. 
Thereby, interaction becomes tied to use and to tasks; this is 
emphasized in what has been called HCI’s turn to practice 
[56]. Seeing interaction as tool use assumes a sort of unity 
of the artefact and the purpose it is used for [3].  
This view emphasizes usefulness and utility as key evalua-
tion criteria of good interaction. Good interaction is defined 
via the significance of the functions the tool can be used to 
perform [1,2]. It can succeed or fail to extend our reach, 
amplify force, or more generally amplify our capabilities, 
be they physical, virtual, or cognitive. Moreover, using the 
tool with a feel of direct engagement with the object of in-
terest is preferable to focusing on the tool. Thus, directness 
[43] is key, sometimes also described as transparent, disap-
pearing, or invisible interfaces.  
This concept has inspired several forms of support for eval-
uation and construction of interaction. Beaudoin-Lafon 
suggested that the degree of compatibility [7] is key. The 
latter, for instance, concerns “the similarity between the 
physical actions of the users on the instrument and the re-
sponse of the object” (p. 450). Although Beaudoin-Lafon 
does not consider this an evaluation dimension, higher 
compatibility seems better. Analysis of breakdowns is an 
activity theory approach to evaluation [11] 
Interaction  as  Optimal  Behavior  
This concept sees interaction as adaptive behavior maxim-
izing utility under constraints posed by task, own capabili-
ties, and the UI. That is, interaction is joint computer-user 
behavior where a user pursues some goal or utility to the 
best of his/her capability within constraints posed by the UI, 
environment, and the task. Interaction emerges in a system 
consisting of rewards and costs (or utilities), actions, and 
constraints (e.g., structure of environment). Adaptation is 
exhibited in different strategies for using a computer.  
The concept rests on the idea of rationality: over time, peo-
ple approximate optimal adaptation to constraints. There is 
abundance of evidence on this idea in motor control, learn-
ing, perception, and complex cognitive activities [28]. No-
table theories explaining adaptation are information forag-
ing, adaptive interaction, economic models, rational analy-
sis, and, more recently, computational rationality. For in-
stance, foraging theory assumes that an adaptive animal 
changes the patch as soon as the gain in calories decreases 
to a level at which it would make more sense to move 
somewhere else. Information foraging theory [71] uses an 
analogue where “prey” is information and the environment 
is a digital environment. As in food foraging, information 
ecologies are patchy: information is unevenly distributed in 
regions, or patches, with different contents and expected 
gains. These properties form constraints and costs that the 
agent must take into account. From what is locally visible, 
the informavore must infer what the distant environment 
may carry. To understand the informavore’s behavior, one 
needs to understand decision-making under uncertainty.  
Good interaction is thus defined via proximity of the joint 
computer-plus-user performance to the maximum level it 
might attain. However, the “optimality” of behavior should 
not be mistaken for the pursuit of high performance in par-
ticular. One insight from research on interactive behavior is 
that even user behavior that appears lazy or ignorant can be 
optimal for the organism to the extent it prefers saving ef-
fort over maximizing performance [68]. Similarly, novice 
users may not be performing optimally but, given their level 
of knowledge or the design, are simply not able to do better. 
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 The main contribution to design and evaluation is the anal-
ysis it offers for understanding how the structure of the 
UI—temporal, spatial, and statistical—affects behavior. 
Theories like information foraging, adaptive information 
framework, and economic models of interaction have been 
used to understand adaptation of behavior, choice, and 
strategies as a function of UI design. And empirical studies 
have adopted these notions, reporting a surprisingly vast 
scope of strategic adaptation across domains of interaction 
[51], from pointing with mouse [29], through learning to 
use a complex UI [9], to the use of the external world as a 
memory [30]. Such observations are supported by the con-
cept of adaptive behavior, but not so much by, for example, 
interaction-as-transmission nor interaction-as-dialogue. 
Interaction  as  Embodied  Action  
This concept sees interaction as embodiment: being and par-
ticipating in the world [25,83,91]. Dourish [25] and Wino-
grad and Flores [91] root this concept in the ecological psy-
chology of Gibson and the hermeneutic phenomenology of 
Heidegger. Other notable work include Suchman [83], who 
emphasized situatedness in technology use. Unlike the in-
teraction-as-tool-use concept, which is essentially a third-
person view, embodiment and situatedness emphasize the 
first-person view: “doing being a user”.  
Three essential concepts for understanding interaction are 
intentionality (the aboutness of action), coupling, and con-
text [25]. Instead of analyzing how the motion of a user’s 
arm moves a cursor toward a target on a display, interac-
tion-as-embodiment highlights the intention of the user 
(e.g., browsing social media) and how his/her actions are 
coupled with multiple contexts (sitting in a chair, working, 
being tired). For the user, the mouse is ready-to-hand and 
used for “browsing a social media” or “doing my work”, 
and only when something unexpected occurs, it may be-
come present-at-hand. Interaction-as-embodied-action fo-
cuses on the lived experience, and it relies less on invariant 
structures in explanation, such as mental representations. It 
rather emphasizes and expounds the nuanced and multifac-
eted effects that context has in interaction. What we view as 
interaction emerges in a situation and cannot be reduced 
back to either the human or the world. This view also em-
phasizes how our bodies shape everything we think and do. 
Since the computer can be involved as an instrument in ac-
tion, as well as being its object, there is no single way to de-
fine good interaction except via a negation: a well-defined 
artefact does not disrupt human pursuits. In good interac-
tion, by contrast, the technology offers resources for the 
human to better participate and be in the world, to “be more 
human”. In reality-based interaction [45], for example, 
good interaction taps and respects skill relating to body and 
social awareness. Other important concepts in this view are 
present-at-hand and ready-to-hand [84,91], seamfulness 
[18], and place [32]. Proponents of these concepts empha-
size a fluent relationship among intentionality, context, and 
coupling in action, and discuss their breakdowns.  
This concept also has been used to suggest support for 
evaluation and construction of interaction. Because of the 
assumed nature of context and situatedness, unlike in the 
previous views, researchers never developed a “model” or 
“metric” of embodied interaction with clear-cut concepts 
and a reasoning apparatus. Rather, focus shifted to method-
ology, a departure from the lab-driven approach, rooted in 
the cognitive paradigm [22]. The new analytical lens neces-
sitated an “in the wild” approach to data collection and 
“thick description” of interaction as it emerges. 
Interaction  as  Experience  
Interaction is here described as shaped by the users’ expec-
tations, momentary unfolding of experience, and recounting 
of episodes of interaction. While experience may be 
thought to be an epiphenomenon, a side effect of sorts, this 
concept heralds its role in shaping how we use computers. 
The concept is about interaction because people appraise, 
attribute, and realize their experiences to and with the user 
interface; experience is also a constantly ongoing part of in-
teracting. This view is anchored in research on user experi-
ence [38], and well exemplified by work from McCarthy 
and Wright [94] and Hassenzahl [34].  
The key proposition of this view is that human experience 
is a key factor in how interaction unfolds. For Hassenzahl, 
experience is a “momentary, primarily evaluative feeling 
(good-bad) while interacting with a product or service” [35, 
p. 12]. This feeling is part of all interaction, and is shaped 
by and shaping interaction. For example, expectations of in-
teraction shape how people interact and how they assess the 
goodness of an interface [94]. Moreover, similar interac-
tions are assessed quite differently, depending on their or-
der (for instance, the most recent and most intense moments 
matter differently [20]). The varieties of experience during 
interaction are as wide-ranging as human experience. Alt-
hough experience can be considered an evaluative feeling, 
research has in particular concerned aesthetics [86], emo-
tion [59], and need fulfillment [37], but it can also concern 
feelings of surprise or stimulation. Although experience can 
be about usefulness, the key focus is on non-utilitarian as-
pects of experience (e.g., those relating to pleasure and 
meaning, [60]). This view also argues that experiences can-
not simply be mapped to interface features or steps in the 
interaction. This has led to a study of “experiential qualities 
of technology use rather than product qualities” [37, p. 
353]. The underlying idea is that experiences of interaction 
are the result of appraisal [78], that is, of our cognitive 
evaluations of events. Moreover, people feel that experi-
ences are caused by the interaction to different degrees; this 
is often called attribution in studies of user experience [37].  
Interaction-as-experience has refined our view of good in-
teraction. In particular, it has helped emphasize non-
instrumental qualities (by definition different from those re-
lating to the tool-use-view because they are not about utili-
ty); research uses such measures extensively [6]. Further-
more, this concept has helped identify the influence of ex-
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 pectations on experience (e.g., [94]) and the many ways ex-
perience shows how we recall episodes of interaction.  
This concept has several implications for design, such as 
positive design [23] and patterns of associations between 
design and experiences (e.g., Experience Design [36]). 
Interaction  as  Control  
Finally, control theory sees interaction as interactive mini-
mization of error against some reference or goal state of the 
user. Although not commonly recognized as part of HCI lit-
erature, control theory precedes HCI and has influenced its 
terminology. Yet it differs from the above concepts. Some 
notions of control theory are widely used in the HCI litera-
ture, such as feedback, feedforward, control, input, output, 
state, and system [46]. However, only a handful of papers 
actually deploys it in HCI [31,40,54,72]. 
In control theory, interaction is defined via a system aiming 
to change a control signal to a desired level (called the ref-
erence) and updating its behavior according to feedback. In 
human use of a computer, the user receives feedback about 
the state of the computer and produces output (feedforward) 
to change it toward the reference. Thus, human-computer 
interaction is a system of goals, signals (inputs and outputs), 
feedback, feedforward, and states. A user is a goal-directed 
controller acting with reference to some feedback about the 
state of the system. States store energy (or information), 
represented mathematically as integrators. Control theory 
assumes that all interaction is continuous, or analogous, alt-
hough a computer may register it as discrete events.  
Its potential value lies in how it makes multiple aspects of 
‘goodness’ of interaction explicit and actionable, for exam-
ple, notions like distance to goal (error), speed of conver-
gence, and stability in the face of noise or uncertainty. It 
permits a multi-level analysis that can expose lower-level 
causes of emergent system-level issues such as sluggish 
performance or errors. Consider pointing for example. Un-
like statistical models such as Fitts’ Law, control theory can 
predict velocity and acceleration profiles and allow inspect-
ing overshoot, settling time, peak time, and rise time during 
pointing. For an analyst, it offers tools like block diagrams 
and step-wise simulations to model complex interactive be-
havior. This could support design and evaluation by antici-
pating some of the dynamic ways system-level behavior 
emerges without expensive studies. By manipulating a 
model, a researcher can investigate what would happen if, 
for example, some aspect of the user (e.g., biomechanics) or 
the device (e.g., transfer function, precision) changed.  
WHAT  WORK  DO  THE  CONCEPTS  DO?  
Next we discuss the work these concepts can do for indi-
vidual HCI researchers and for the field, based on Table 1.  
Drawing  Boundaries  Around  Interaction  
The concepts of interaction vary significantly in how they 
portray boundaries of the computer and the human, and the 
extent to which interaction requires us to consider them as 
one system (see Table 1, column View of interaction). For in-
stance, does it involve the interface only or also that on 
which the interface acts or even non-computing parts essen-
tial to the interaction? What is the time span of interaction?  
For instance, the view of the computer differs. Interaction-
as-transmission looks at the efficiency with which an in-
tended message can be communicated and correctly regis-
tered, which focuses a researcher’s attention on the in-
put/output interface. In contrast, interaction-as-embodied 
situates technology in a praxis and is therefore unwilling to 
clearly delineate computer artefacts and separate them from 
non-computing artefacts (see [79]). Some critiques of inter-
action, for instance that of Taylor [85], miss the observation 
that different concepts of interaction come with different 
scopes; that is, some focus on interaction, others on context. 
Likewise, the view of the human differs. Some concepts 
excel by relating the human to its social and physical con-
text (e.g., interaction-as-embodiment); others focus narrow-
ly on humans as senders, noisy channels, and receivers 
(e.g., interaction-as-transmission). How one thinks about in-
teraction thus relates to key debates in HCI. The third wave 
debate [12], for instance, is about extending the scope of the 
human, but at least in some interpretations it throws out 
views of interaction with narrower scope that are complete-
ly useful (and at times necessary).  
Our second observation about scope is that some concepts 
of interaction see the boundary around the entire computer-
human system; because interaction links human and com-
puter, it makes little sense to analyze them separately. This 
is true for tool use and optimal behavior; the earlier quote 
by Butler (“nothing is a tool except during use”) highlight-
ed this. By contrast, interaction-as-experience subscribes to 
no such link. Interaction as an ongoing stream of expecta-
tions, feelings, and memories does not depend on a tool. 
This raises an important point for user experience research. 
While it describes what makes up experience, much of it is 
about downstream consequences of interaction [37] or 
about its emotional quality [59]. Theories of user experi-
ence say little about how the human-computer relationship 
is construed such that both entities affect each other.  
A third observation is that the views differ in the time-
scales at which they consider interaction (see also [71]). 
Some operate at the level of seconds (e.g., interaction-as- 
control, interaction-as-transmission), others at the level of 
Newell’s unit task, and still others consider both expecta-
tions and memories of interaction (e.g., interaction-as-
experience). The time-scale is related to whether concepts 
emphasize expert or novice users. Interaction-as-
transmission often focuses on expert performance and con-
cepts like mediation (how tools shape our thinking about 
the world) and the task-artefact cycle, both related to tool-
use, require long periods of use and proficient users.  
Vocabulary  for  Phenomena  in  Interaction  
The concepts of interaction each identify distinct phenome-
na in interaction (see Table 1, column Key phenomena and 
constructs). These are important for problem-solving in 
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 HCI [66] in that they create or elaborate “descriptions of re-
al-world phenomena related to human use of computing” 
(p. 4958). This is important, because concepts not only sen-
sitize a reader to certain aspects of interaction but also pro-
vide vocabulary and a reasoning apparatus to work with 
them. The more general consideration relating to these is 
their ability to transfer; that is, how well they “transfer to 
neighboring problems or other instances of the problem” 
[66, p. 4959]. Concepts that are transferable equip a re-
searcher with a general tool to work with interaction. 
For example, the concepts of mapping and feedback (inter-
action-as-tool-use) are useful because they explain break-
downs in interaction known to most users of everyday arte-
facts and computers; they are further transferable across a 
range of contexts and technologies. The concept of map-
ping has been used in as diverse fields as mid-air-gestures 
and augmented reality. The existence of such transferable 
concepts relating to interaction helps HCI. 
A  Yard  Stick  for  “Good  Interaction”  
Table 1 (column Good interaction) further suggests that con-
cepts of interaction come with some assumed notion of 
when interaction is good or successful. Concepts of interac-
tion, as concepts often are, are value-laden. This is notewor-
thy because it means that one’s notion of interaction pre-
scribes a particular aim for design. For tool-use it is primar-
ily about usefulness; for dialogue it is ease of translation or 
mapping (naturalness); and for embodiment it is coupling. 
It also means that measures of interaction are interpreted 
differently. For instance, the role of time in “goodness” is 
interpreted quite differently in the various concepts [41]: 
For transfer and tool-use, time should be minimized, for 
embodied action it becomes relevant only upon disruption.  
Taking  New  Perspectives    
Based on Table 1 and discussion above you might wonder: 
“Given the views of interaction, which is right?”. We find 
this question misguided. Whether or not they are true is less 
important than whether they are useful for understanding 
phenomena in human use of computing or interactive tech-
nology. The second reason is pragmatic. We argue that 
knowing many concepts better help a researcher see new 
opportunities in research and change perspectives when 
reaching an impasse. Or, when reaching an impasse, per-
haps a new concept can be invoked. Perspective can be 
changed to rethink scope, constructs, or criteria for good-
ness. Compared to earlier discussions of interaction [70] 
and theories of HCI [75], we believe the present set of con-
cepts on interaction can be more directly used for this. 
How might perspective-taking be useful in everyday HCI 
research? Let us take work on electric muscle stimulation 
(EMS) as an example. EMS in HCI has been used to gener-
ate prototypes that can move users’ hands and arms and 
serve as new ways of body-based output. EMS work seems 
to conceive of interaction mostly as transmission of infor-
mation, in particular, how one can control the limbs of the 
users in the most accurate way. In essence, this is about 
dealing with the noise channel of electrically stimulating a 
user’s arm to produce movement. And it is about through-
put of that channel, for instance, as modelled, as done by 
(for instance) Kaul et al. [50], or accuracy of recognition, as 
done by (for instance) Lopes and Baudisch [57]. We argue 
that the concepts of interaction may be used to think 
through alternative directions for EMS in HCI. Take inter-
action-as-tool-use. This concept emphasizes mediation by 
the EMS system and the disappearance of tools; both of 
which are unexplored in EMS work. Or take interaction-as-
embodied-action and its emphasis on how the user being 
situated in a social world changes the way an interface is 
being used: how do onlookers perceive motion by EMS and 
what is the experience of interacting with other people, say, 
giving a handshake, through muscle stimulation?  
CONSTRUING  THE  HUMAN-­COMPUTER  RELATIONSHIP  
The previous discussion made several observations about 
differences in the scope and the work that concepts of inter-
action do. However, this discussion has mainly identified 
dimensions but not gone deeply into the ways in which the 
concepts help us move from a folk notion of interaction to a 
notion that really explains interaction.  
Let us illustrate the concern by comparing two views, 
transmission and embodiment. Consider Fitts’ Law (a key 
technique in interaction-as-transmission). Its core assump-
tion is that the properties of the motor system and those of 
an input device place an upper boundary to pointing per-
formance. Yet this boundary is only statistical: it applies to 
aggregates of multiple trials. In contrast, compare interac-
tion-as-embodiment. In this view, “input” gains meaning 
only as part of engagements such as communicating with 
other people. Those elements, in context, shape what “do-
ing” and “being” a user means. The raw performance of an 
input device is largely irrelevant in that context unless a dis-
ruption that brings it to the fore. This concept qualitatively 
examines a complex web of effects, factors, and phenomena 
to describe an interaction, prioritizing descriptive thickness.  
Our idea for a starting a serious discussion of such differ-
ences more generally is based on Bunge’s typology of 
causal explanations [13]. This provides a thinking tool to 
answer Bannon’s call for reconsidering the human-
technology relationships [5]. 
Reasoning  About  Interaction  According  to  Bunge  
According to Bunge [13] causal determination is just one 
of the multiple forms of relationships we employ in modern 
scientific explanation. Bunge uses the notion determination, 
an umbrella term for the various ways in which two things 
can be connected and influence each other. He develops a 
rich typology for determination. In addition to causal de-
termination, the types of determination include teleological, 
mechanical, statistical, structural, dialectical, interaction 
(which for Bunge is reciprocal causation such as in gravity), 
and quantitative self-determination.  
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 With Bunge, human-computer interaction is about the de-
termination that both the computer and the human have on 
events that unfold in computer use. Events in computer use 
can be attributed solely neither to the human nor to the 
computer. The two must be considered together. Some con-
cepts appear to embrace this better than others. For exam-
ple, we argued earlier how interaction-as-experience is only 
starting to discuss mutual (e.g., appraisal) instead of one-
way determination, whereas interaction-as-tool-use gives 
the tool its “toolness” only in and via some human activity. 
Let us try to see if clarity ensues from relating Bunge’s 
types of determination to concepts of interaction. Note that 
some concepts deploy more than one type of determination. 
First off, we note that all concepts we have discussed above 
use teleological determination. That is, human intentions 
postulate a norm or goal of interaction. Even the view of in-
teraction-as-transmission assumes that the human sender 
has a message in mind. Some views, such as interaction-as-
embodied-action and interaction-as-dialogue, explicitly 
mention intentions. In interaction-as-optimal-behavior, we 
have intentions defined precisely as utilities.  
Mechanical determination refers to explanation of conse-
quence by the antecedent; for instance, human sends input, 
which is processed, which changes the computer's state, 
which responds, which human registers, etc. Some models 
related to interaction-as-dialogue, say GOMS and Key-
stroke-Level Modeling (KLM) [14], are deterministic in 
this way. In KLM and GOMS, interaction is described as 
sequences of deterministic processing steps with defined 
costs and outputs. Other models such as ACT-R [1] have 
relaxed the mechanistic assumption and added stochastic 
components (e.g., when modeling learning and memory). 
Statistical determination characterizes the end results of 
interaction as being jointly determined, stochastically, by 
some efficient causes and mutual forces. The point is not to 
describe in exact and exhaustive terms how they affect each 
other, but to capture statistically their effect on antecedents 
of interaction. Fitts’ Law and information foraging are ex-
amples following two different interaction concepts, yet 
both engage in statistical reasoning about the joint effects.  
Structural determination refers to explanation of parts by 
the whole. Information-as-optimal-behavior engages in this 
form systematically [68]. Information foraging theory, for 
example, assumes that certain exploration behavior emerges 
as a function of how the environment is arranged. Another 
well-known example is related to tool-use, name task anal-
ysis. It is the structure of the task that affects what acts the 
user performs and in what order. Interaction-as-
embodiment employs this too, as does, for example, the 
theory of situated action. They reject the mechanistic cau-
sality of mental representations and claim that users’ plans 
are only weakly related to how they actually behave, which 
instead emerges situationally in an unpredictable and un-
planned manner in a complex web of phenomena.  
We could not identify examples of dialectical determinism 
nor Bunge’s interaction, which he exemplifies with gravity 
and the interactive effect that planetary bodies have on each 
other. However, we noted that control-theoretical models 
subscribe to Bunge’s quantitative self-determination: 
similar to thermodynamics, they describe interaction as 
continuous unfolding of states that differ from one another 
in quantitative respects.  
THREE  BLIND  SPOTS  IN  CONCEPTS  OF  INTERACTION  
Above we have argued that theorizing related to the differ-
ent concepts differ (1) in scope, and (2) in the apparatus 
used for causal reasoning. This is important because con-
struals of the human-computer relationship implicitly con-
strain how one can or cannot work with phenomena in in-
teraction. Let us discuss three such limitations.  
First, while all concepts subscribe to teleological reason-
ing, most say little about how intentions are formed or af-
fected by interaction. All concepts we reviewed commit to 
some causal role of intentions (e.g., goals)—even the low-
er-level control and transmission views. However, inten-
tions are taken-for-granted and precede interaction. Even 
Norman’s “gulfs” say nothing about how they change via 
interaction. An exception is the interaction-as-embodiment 
view, which speaks about intentions and agency, but which 
still is silent about how intentions evolve. Thus, HCI, via its 
concepts, has had an overwhelming tendency to understand 
interaction as one-sided—as channeling and realization of 
human intentions through a computer, furthermore assum-
ing that these intentions are outside the realm of interaction 
itself. This has created a ‘blind spot’, with implications for 
our ability to address some important contemporary topics. 
For designers, this means that they are not able to anticipate 
how user experience changes over the course of interaction, 
as users discover new opportunities for action. And it 
means that we have no good models for multi-party interac-
tion (e.g., among multiple users and computer agents), such 
as in persuasive computing or human-robot interaction.  
Second, none of the concepts of interaction offers anything 
in terms of a workable concept about what a computer or 
computing is in interaction, as opposed to any human-made 
artefact or natural object. Compare this to the amount of at-
tention to models of users in HCI. The seven concepts of 
interaction appear to apply to anything from interaction 
with doorknobs to that with Turing machines. Whether 
some piece of technology is, internally, a door handle or a 
Turing machine is a non-issue, although questions like this 
are at the core of computer science. There is little “C” in 
HCI. The point that HCI research is not about (Turing-
strong) computers but about technology, systems, media-
tion, or experience, has been made by many others before 
us (e.g., [5,15,24,76,80]), but not by these grounds.  
Third, in our attempts to extract concepts of interaction, we 
used the work of Dubin [26] and tried to extract from the 
literature propositions about the link or interplay or type of 
action between humans and computers. Somewhat surpris-
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 ingly, finding such propositions is hard, even for well-
established theories, not to mention critical discussions or 
empirical tests of their validity. For instance, consider as an 
example Norman’s seven-stage model. It is present in one 
form or another in most HCI textbooks as well as in a lot of 
papers in HCI. Yet its propositions about the interplay are 
oddly limited. It says that interaction proceeds in stages, but 
even Norman disagrees with that [62, pp. 41-42]. It says 
that interaction is a dialogue, but ignores the longer-term 
goals and consequences of that dialogue. Whereas Nor-
man’s model provides important concepts, it has limited 
empirical support; we cannot think of a single empirical 
challenge of the model. Our work using Bunge also suggest 
that extracting propositions about the specifics of determi-
nation from the HCI literature is a very hard task. 
UNDERSTANDING  LIMITS  OF  CONSTRUCTIVE  POWER    
The observant reader will have noted that we did not dis-
cuss in depth, so far, the column about evaluation and de-
sign in Table 1 (Example Support for evaluation and design). 
This is rooted in an unease with the extent to which views 
of interaction support thinking about construction, an essen-
tial part of problem-solving in HCI [66]. For the present 
paper, this has to do with how concepts of interaction can 
inform design. If they cannot, the link between theorizing 
and construction would be broken [53,66]. While plenty of 
attention has been devoted to how empirical studies can in-
form design, we know of no attempt to systematically look 
at HCI’s concepts and theories for this end.  
To address this, we first need to understand what it means 
for concepts of interaction (or any construct in HCI) to in-
form design. Intuitively, to inform design means that a de-
signer is better able to achieve some desired ends in interac-
tion given the concept. Users fare better when something 
has been designed using a concept than when it has not. 
Thus, concepts must inform design towards better choices. 
To then understand what actionable information may look 
like, we need the notion of counterfactual reasoning. Coun-
terfactual reasoning allows us to anticipate what happens in 
some speculated conditions of interaction. If some condi-
tion of interaction were (hypothetically) to change, it would 
tell what consequences to process or what outcomes are 
likely. Fitts’ Law is a straightforward example: A change in 
the spatial properties of a target (distance or width, D or W) 
affects average pointing performance (outcome) in a statis-
tically reliable manner. Thus, the constructive power of an 
HCI construct (concept, theory, model) is the scope, validi-
ty, and practical relevance of the counterfactual reasoning 
it permits that links the conditions of interaction and its 
events (process and outcomes).  
Let us use Fitts’ Law to illustrate this. Scope refers to the 
number of conditions and events, and level of detail therein, 
that a construct applies to. Fitts’ Law’s scope is narrow in 
this sense. It maps two variables (D and W) to one variable 
(MT). To increase its scope, it should be extended to talk 
about other design choices, such as colors or input modali-
ty. Validity refers to the construct’s ability to produce em-
pirically testable and accurate predictions. Fitts’ Law pre-
dicts statistical averages of pointing performance, but it is 
mute about how an individual might perform in an individ-
ual act of pointing. Finally, practical relevance refers to 
how important these design decisions and events are to de-
signers. Fitts’ Law becomes relevant when improving a 
widely-used interface for a mass of experienced users. 
Hence, it is relevant in some but not most design projects.  
With this definition, we can start dividing constructs into 
classes according to what they offer in design: 
Design-agnostic constructs do not support counterfactual 
reasoning linking conditions of interaction to events. The 
theory of computer self-efficacy [21], related to interaction-
as-experience, for example, does not link perceived self-
efficacy to conditions influenced by designers, but talks 
about a user’s expectations and perceptions. Similarly, a 
claim about two types of experience (viz., utilitarian, he-
donic) is sometimes made without linking their emergence 
to conditions of interaction. The issue is that constructs in 
this category can inform design only after the fact. They are 
weak in their ability to inform design. At their best, they 
can point out objectives to a designer and offer empirical 
methodology and measurement instruments. This might still 
be valuable for understanding and theorizing about phe-
nomena, but less so for designing.  
Design-sensitizing constructs, in contrast, point toward 
opportunities in design (conditions) but do not tell how 
changes in those conditions affect interaction. They are 
valuable to the extent that such opportunity might be oth-
erwise overlooked. Consider seamful interaction [18]. It 
tells us that one should make technological enablers visible 
to users when their breakdowns and disfluencies affect 
them. However, it does not tell how to design seams for un-
derstandability or to avoid them becoming disfluencies 
themselves. Generally, constructs in this category provide 
ideas and inspiration to design, but do not strongly guide 
our choices. Direct manipulation (interaction-as-tool-use) 
suggest that command languages are worse because humans 
are better at recognition than at recall. But it does not say 
how features of an interface are linked to recognition.  
We note that some of the theories involved in interaction-
as-embodied-action and interaction-as-tool-use are “super-
frameworks” with multiple design-sensitizing constructs. 
Their value is in that they are frameworks that link multiple 
phenomena and factors, sensitizing a reader to them. Yet 
they do not explicate how their relation is shaped in some 
particular interaction. 
Design-determining constructs, finally, comprise the class 
of constructs that link design variables to events in interac-
tion in some determinate way. This means that they can in-
form a particular or probably good decision, such as what 
modality to use or which type of feedback motivates users 
to stay in a service. As discussed, there are multiple types 
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 of determinacy, from statistical to structural to teleological, 
so this determinacy can take different forms. Our view is 
that the theories that design-determining constructs HCI has 
mostly come from behavioral and social sciences, includ-
ing, among many others, such theories as information for-
aging theory, theories of color, task analysis, or cognitive 
simulations (e.g., EPIC).  
A  Dilemma  for  Concepts  of  Interaction  
With these three groups in mind, we return to point out a di-
lemma in HCI’s ability to support design: While we have 
concepts of interaction that talk about design (many, in 
fact), we have failed to produce theories and concepts that 
have both high determinacy and adequate scope. In other 
words, we cannot find concepts of interaction (or, general 
HCI constructs or theories, for that matter) that deal with a 
large number of phenomena at the level of specificity that is 
needed to inform design decisions.  
Instead, those concepts fall into two types, both unsatisfac-
tory: (1) high determinacy but inadequate scope and (2) 
large scope but low determinacy. Examples of the former 
are classic mathematical and simulation models of the user 
subscribing to interaction-as-dialogue, interaction-as-
transmission, interaction-as-control, and interaction-as-
optimal-behavior. Examples of the latter can be found from 
theories around interaction-as-embodiment, interaction-as-
tool-use, interaction-as-experience, such as theories like sit-
uated action, distributed cognition, embodied interaction, 
and so on. While they encompass several phenomena relat-
ed to design, they offer very little direct guidance to con-
crete decisions in design. This is related to the difference 
between understanding and prediction, discussed in depth 
by Dubin [26]; here, however, the tension seems to be be-
tween understanding and constructing.   
To conclude, design and engineering in HCI involve com-
plex decisions and complex phenomena, but HCI has only 
offered either high-determinacy models with limited scope, 
implying that one has to use many of such models, or 
broadly scoped theories with low determinacy, implying 
that one must carry out empirical studies to understand the 
case at hand. Although frowned upon by some HCI schol-
ars, compare this situation to that in areas of engineering 
that routinely use theories such as mechanics or dynamics 
to inform complex projects such as in civil engineering. We 
find it important to work toward higher determinacy and 
wider scope in HCI theories.  
INTERACTION,  REVISITED  
After all this, what is interaction? Let us first answer this in 
the negative: Interaction is not the idea promoted and re-
peated in folk notions that a computer and a human are en-
gaged in some interplay. HCI researchers should not be sat-
isfied with definitions that are simply listings of dimensions 
of this everyday concept.  
What is it, then? Our extraction of concepts from HCI theo-
ries gives a preliminary idea. Following Bunge, interaction 
concerns two entities that determine each other’s behavior 
over time. In HCI, the entities are computers (ranging from 
input devices to systems) and humans (ranging from end-
effectors to tool users). Their mutual determination can be 
of many types, including statistical, mechanical, and struc-
tural. But their causal relationship is teleologically deter-
mined: Users, with their goals and pursuits, are the ultimate 
metric of interaction. From here on, how researchers con-
strue that determination influences the phenomena they can 
attend to, what they think good interaction is, and what 
tools they have to offer evaluation and design. We showed 
that there are at least seven endpoints to such construals, 
each with distinguishable boundaries and scopes, determi-
nations, and valuations. The fact that the relation between 
human and computer can be construed in so many ways has 
(thus far) made the concept so elusive. We have shown that 
interaction, as a concept, can do much more work in HCI 
than it has done thus far [85,88]. This observation calls for 
applications, expansions, and critiques of these concepts, 
rather than for throwing them away. It is clear that our se-
lection of views was selective; we look forward to system-
atic, large-scale reviews of concepts of interaction in HCI. 
We can now offer an explanation to Kostakos’ contention 
of “a big hole in HCI research” [53]. Conceptions of inter-
actions have been relatively long-lasting, and they—and the 
key findings associated with them (Table 1)—form a com-
mon core of HCI research, but this core has not been as 
recognized and developed as it could have been. Better 
concepts and theories of interaction is the way of getting 
away from “the hole” and aiming towards HCI research that 
is relatively independent of developments in technologies 
and use situations. Interaction, simply, is the core of HCI.  
Looking forward, HCI research must work on core concepts 
of interaction that can inform its “point studies and point 
designs”. To reach this stage, we need to ask what interac-
tion could be? Based on the preceding discussion, the con-
cepts of interaction should have much more to say about 
design and should be much better able to describe mutual 
dependencies specific to HCI. We must focus much more 
on propositions [26] about interaction: theoretic statements 
that link the determination between humans and computers, 
given certain starting conditions and boundary conditions. 
Those can be quantitative or qualitative; about prediction or 
understanding. Those conditions link theories to design and 
equip researchers/designers with some foresight that has 
been missing. We hope that this essay encourages the de-
velopment of a richer and more useful science of interac-
tion. 
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